O fracasso órfão

Rodrigo Constantino

O sucesso tem muitos pais, o fracasso é órfão. Nunca esse ditado foi tão válido quanto agora, que economistas keynesianos "desenvolvimentistas" se fazem de neutros - ou mesmo de oposição! - em relação ao modelo que trouxe esse grande fracasso econômico. Eu comentei sobre isso aqui, e fico feliz de ver que Alexandre Schwartsman, outro dos que apontou as falhas antes, lá atrás, também não deixou passar batido essa tremenda cara-de-pau. Ele diz:

"Se minha Teoria da Relatividade estiver correta, a Alemanha dirá que sou alemão e a França me declarará um cidadão do mundo. Mas, se não estiver, a França dirá que sou alemão e os alemães dirão que sou judeu."

Enorme (astronômica mesmo) é a distância que vai de Guido Mantega a Albert Einstein, mas não pude deixar de me lembrar dessa frase ao ler a tentativa patética de ilustres representantes do "keynesianismo de quermesse" de renegar modelo econômico adotado recentemente no país, buscando também se distanciar do falante ministro da Fazenda.

Durante os anos em que o país adotou o chamado "tripé macroeconômico", caracterizado pelo câmbio flutuante, pelo compromis- so com as metas de inflação e pelo cumprimento das metas do superavit primário, autodenominados "desenvolvimentistas" não se vexaram de prometer um desempenho melhor caso sua estratégia fosse adotada.

Segundo esse pessoal, seria possível crescer muito mais caso a taxa de câmbio fosse administrada, a taxa de juros, reduzida, o grau de intervenção do governo na economia aumentasse (via políticas setoriais) e a política fiscal fosse relaxada.

Não é necessário nenhum grande salto de imaginação para notar que essas têm sido as vigas mestras do que se convencionou chamar de "nova matriz econômica", que entrou paulatinamente em vigor nos anos finais do governo Lula, ganhando força considerável nestes dois anos e meio da administração Dilma. Diga-se, aliás, que a transição foi aplaudida entusiasticamente por todos os que defendiam essa alternativa ao "tripé".

A tentativa de jogar a culpa em fatores exógenos também demonstra falta de hombridade para assumir os erros. Schwartsman não deixa barato:

É duro de engolir. À parte a desaceleração global ser uma pálida sombra do enfarte econômico de 2008/09, não se pode ignorar o desempenho dos demais países emergentes, em particular os latino-americanos, cujo crescimento tem sido bem mais vigoroso que o brasileiro e sem os nossos desequilíbrios, como mostra a inflação muito mais baixa nesses países.

Partindo de um diagnóstico equivocado, tentam se diferenciar das políticas adotadas como se estas tivessem atuado na direção correta, apenas em intensidade insuficiente. Em outras palavras, defendem gastos ainda maiores, sem aparentemente levar em conta que o dispêndio federal está no nível mais alto da história, muito menos perceber as consequências desse tipo de política sobre a inflação e as contas externas.

Nada esqueceram e nada aprenderam; exceto talvez que a derrota é uma órfã que precisa ser abandonada no primeiro artigo que se tenha chance.

Ouch!

Obama's Real Spending Record

By ARTHUR B. LAFFER AND STEPHEN MOORE, WSJ

President Obama shocked us the other day when he said, "Since I've been president, federal spending has risen at the lowest pace in nearly 60 years." Having heard him champion the "multiplier effects" of deficit-financed stimulus spending, we saw him as an enthusiastic supporter of throwing other people's money at just about any problem.

Thus began our quest to see where we had strayed from the straight and narrow. Here's the picture.

In the chart nearby we've plotted federal government spending on a National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) basis as a share of total U.S. GDP from 1990 to the present. The NIPA numbers are used here as opposed to appropriations or outlays to capture the actual periods when production occurs. The stories the chart tells are amazing.

The first is how much government spending fell during President Bill Clinton's eight years in office and how low it was when he left office. When he became president in 1992, government spending was 23.5% of GDP, and when he left in 2001 it was 19.5% of GDP. President Clinton, in conjunction with a solid Republican Congress, cut government spending by more than any other president in modern times, and oversaw one of the greatest periods of economic growth and prosperity in U.S. history.

Sadly for fiscal conservatives, the biggest surge in government spending came during the last two years of President George W. Bush's eight years in office (2007-2008). A weakened Republican president dealing with a strident Democratic Congress, led by then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, resulted in an orgy of spending.

Mr. Bush and Republicans in Congress capitulated to and even promoted each and every government bailout and populist redistribution canard put before them. It's a long list, starting with the 2003 trillion-dollar Medicare prescription drug benefit and culminating with the actions taken to stem the 2008 financial meltdown—the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program, the bailout of insurance giant AIG and government-sponsored lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the ill-advised 2008 $600-per-person tax rebate, the stimulus add-ons to 2007's housing and farm bills, etc. The script had it that greedy right-wingers were the cause of our collapse, and deficit spending and easy money the answer.

The numbers are mind boggling. From the second quarter of 2007, i.e., the first full quarter of a Pelosi-Reid dominated Congress and a politically weakened President Bush, to the second quarter of 2009 when President Obama assumed office, government spending skyrocketed to 27.3% of GDP from 21.4%. It was the largest peacetime expansion of government spending in U.S. history.

After taking office in 2009, with spending and debt already at record high levels and the deficit headed to $1 trillion, President Obama proceeded to pass his own $830 billion stimulus, auto bailouts, mortgage relief plans, the Dodd-Frank financial reforms and the $1.7 trillion ObamaCare entitlement (which isn't even accounted for in the chart). While spending did come down in 2010, it wasn't the result of spending cuts but rather because TARP loans began to be repaid, and that cash was counted against spending.

In 2011 and 2012, the pace of spending was slowed when a new emboldened breed of Republicans took back the House promising to end the binge. The House Budget Committee, headed by Wisconsin Rep. Paul Ryan, has identified about $150 billion of new spending Mr. Obama wanted in 2011 and 2012 that Republicans would not approve. As the chart shows, government spending as a share of GDP fell, and taxes were not raised. But to attribute this drop in government spending to the president or congressional Democrats would be dishonest.

Slowing spending and the decision not to raise taxes may have prevented the Great Recession from becoming the next Great Depression. In 1930, the Smoot-Hawley tariff was signed into law by another weak Republican president, Herbert Hoover. Smoot-Hawley was the largest single tax increase on traded products in U.S. history. Not surprisingly, the markets collapsed.

Like President Obama, President Hoover proposed massive tax increases. Unlike Mr. Obama, Hoover was successful. The highest marginal income tax rate jumped to 63% from 24% on Jan. 1, 1932. That November, Hoover lost the election to Franklin D. Roosevelt in a landslide.

As if Hoover's tax increases weren't enough, on Jan. 1, 1936, FDR raised the highest marginal income tax rate to 79% with further rate increases up to 83% coming later. Estate and gift taxes, taxes on retained earnings, state and local taxes were also raised. This is why the Great Depression was the Great Depression—massive deficit spending and tax rate increases.

Today's economy is again decelerating in no small part because on Jan. 1, 2012 we face Taxmageddon—the largest automatic tax increase on investment and businesses in generations, including the end of the Bush tax cuts and the more recent payroll tax cut. According to the Congressional Budget Office, this would drain $607 billion out of the economy next year, pushing us back into recession.

Keynesians, of course, are advising more deficit spending and easy money. But the most amazing feature of the nearby chart, which is rarely ever noted, is that when spending declined sharply the economy boomed under President Clinton, and when spending soared under Presidents Bush and Obama, the economy tanked.

Maybe Keynes was wrong and Milton Friedman was right when he warned that government spending is taxation and that government can't tax an economy into prosperity. Friedman made it clear time and again that restraining government spending stimulates the economy by liberating private resources.

The good news is that the tea party Republicans who took office after the 2010 elections have completely altered the face of the opposition. Legislation to repeal ObamaCare and Dodd-Frank soared through the House, as did Rep. Ryan's proposed plan to curb federal spending and lower tax rates for individuals and businesses.

Next, look for an insurrection of closet Clinton New Democrats against their party's big-government leadership, as may have begun last week when Mr. Clinton and other leading Democrats pronounced that all the Bush tax rates should remain in place for another year.

The right point of focus is not at what pace spending has grown under President Obama but instead how much more he needs to cut spending from its bloated levels to bring the economy back to health. The huge increase in spending as a percentage of GDP under Presidents Bush and Obama is the reason we are experiencing the slowest recovery since the Great Depression. As Milton Friedman understood, an economy cannot spend or tax itself into prosperity.
Mr. Laffer is president of Laffer Associates. Mr. Moore is a member of the Journal's editorial board.

Why This Slow Recovery Is Like No Recovery

By ROBERT J. BARRO, WSJ

Last week's dismal jobs report showed little change in payroll employment for May and a slight rise in the unemployment rate to 8.2%, thereby underscoring the weakness of the economic recovery. Although changes in payroll employment and the unemployment rate are important, the key gauge of recession and recovery is the growth rate of real gross domestic product, and that is where our core problems lie.

The average annual growth rate of U.S. GDP since 1948 has been 3.1%. In the recession starting in the third quarter of 2007 and ending in the second quarter of 2009, GDP fell by nearly 5%. But this decline is 10% when gauged relative to trend—that is, after factoring in normal growth. To make up for this shortfall, the subsequent recovery has to attain growth rates averaging above 3% for several years.

This is not an unreasonable expectation. For instance, the GDP growth rate averaged 4.3% per year from 1982 to 1989 following the deep recession of the early 1980s. Yet in the current "recovery," beginning in the second quarter of 2009, growth has averaged only 2.4% per year, and just 1.8% for the first quarter of 2012. This low growth means that the U.S. economy has actually been falling further and further behind the normal trend. Therefore, it is not a recovery at all.



Getty Images

The Obama administration likes to blame the country's weak economic performance on the Bush administration, Europe's debt crisis, Japan's tsunami and so on. President Obama's advisers are now saying they learned only gradually that the economy was in even worse shape than they had imagined in 2009. But even if this is so, it gets the signals backwards: A bigger recession predicts a stronger recovery (as has to be true for the economy to return to its trend line).

The pattern of strong recoveries following sharp downturns is clear when one examines the history of economic disasters. The worst depressions relate to wartime destruction, and the subsequent peacetime periods typically exhibit strong growth. Examples include the high post-World War II growth rates in Japan, Germany and much of Western Europe.

The pattern applies also to non-war depressions, including the Great Depression of the 1930s. U.S. GDP growth from 1933 to 1940—starting from the trough of the Depression and ending before the economy was heavily influenced by World War II—was a remarkable 7% per year, despite the 1937-38 recession.

A better argument can be made that recoveries are typically sluggish following a real-estate crash and prolonged declines in housing prices, as the U.S. has recently experienced. In a study of international housing crises published May 2 by Global Economics Weekly, Jose Ursua examines long-term house-price data for 11 countries, including the U.S. His sample included 65 housing busts, defined as falls in average house prices by at least 15%. The bottom line is that housing crises do impede subsequent recoveries.

However, the average GDP growth rate during the U.S. recovery since 2009 remains nearly 2% per year lower than would be expected, according to the Ursua study. That is, after factoring in the estimated impact of the typical housing bust, Mr. Ursua found that the U.S. growth rate since 2009 should have averaged a little over 4%, rather than the 2.4% we've experienced.

What's interfering with a real recovery? Perhaps the Obama administration should stop casting blame elsewhere and examine the policies it has implemented to ease the pain of recession and falling housing prices. (Some of those, to be fair, were initiated under the Bush administration.)

Consider the expansion of social-safety-net programs, including food stamps, unemployment insurance, Medicaid (prospectively) and housing and mortgage programs. In a study published last month by the National Bureau of Economic Research, University of Chicago economist Casey Mulligan observed that, because these programs were means-tested (falling or ending as income rises), expanding them raised the effective marginal tax rate on labor income.

Specifically, Mr. Mulligan estimates that the effective marginal tax rate for low-income households went from around 40% in 2007, before the recession started, to about 48% in 2009, at the start of the recovery. Thus, while these programs may be attractive from the standpoint of assisting poor families, they dilute incentives to work.

To achieve a real recovery, government policy should focus on individual incentives to work, produce and invest. Central here are tax rates and regulations, including especially clarity about future policies. In a successful policy package, the government would get its fiscal house in order and make meaningful long-term reforms to entitlement programs and the tax structure.

The Obama administration seems to think that individual incentives and serious fiscal reforms are of no great importance and policy should emphasize Keynesian-style demand stimulus (public works, prolonged benefits) along with bits of industrial policy (loans and grants to "green" energy companies). This approach has failed for three years.

Mr. Barro is a professor of economics at Harvard and a senior fellow of Stanford University's Hoover Institution.

Sensible Keynesians see no easy way out

By Raghuram Rajan, Financial Times 

In the long run we are not dead, we will still be recovering from the Great Recession. We should therefore weigh stimulus policies not just on their immediate effect but on their consequences over time. Sensible Keynesians recognise this. They bet that reviving growth through government spending today outweighs the future loss of growth as the debt taken on to fund current spending is paid back. Consider two circumstances where this may apply.

The first is in a fully fledged panic where demand collapses, banks and companies fail and organisational capital is destroyed. Save, possibly, for Greece, it is hard to argue any industrial country is there today.

The key question then is whether more government spending can make a real difference to the most severe employment problems. Here the case for a general stimulus becomes less compelling. In the US, demand is weakest in communities where a boom and bust in house prices has left an overhang of household debt. Lower local demand has hit employment in industries such as retail and restaurants. A general increase in government spending may be too blunt – greater demand in New York is not going to help families eat out in Las Vegas (and hence create more restaurant jobs there). Targeted household debt write-offs in Las Vegas could be a better use of stimulus dollars.The second is when persistent high unemployment leads the long term unemployed to lose the habits and skills that make them employable. This is probably the more pertinent case in several industrial countries, such as the US and Spain. Increasing employment in a sustainable way today could more than pay for itself if people who would otherwise drop out of the workforce earn incomes.

However, the past build-up of debt in now depressed areas may suggest that demand was too high relative to incomes. If so, demand, without the dangerous stimulant of borrowing, will stay weak. Policy should instead help workers move where there are suitable jobs – for instance, by helping them offload their homes and the associated debt without the stigma of default.

Employment is also lower in states that experienced a housebuilding bust. In these states, unemployment is higher among construction workers and in related jobs such as real estate brokerage. Could big publicly funded infrastructure projects, modelled on those in the 1930s, re-employ them? Possibly not, since today’s built-up US is less in need of infrastructure on that scale. Moreover, it is not clear that a worker used to putting up drywall can move easily to laying fibre-optic cable. Perhaps it would be better policy to support retraining for private jobs.

Japan, which had a huge property boom and bust in the late 1980s, provides a salutary warning of the difficulties of stimulus through infrastructure spending. Even though Japan covered much of the country with concrete, it never fully emerged from the crisis. For the Japanese, the long run has arrived, and they are older, fewer and have the highest government debt in the G7.

The US government can still spend. The UK is more on the margin. With a huge financial sector dependent on the government’s financial standing, it can take fewer chances with its finances. Austerity is painful, which is why austerity tomorrow is not credible. Yet shared tax increases and spending cuts can instil a sense of national purpose to help a country weather tough times.

For Greece, government spending is the problem, not the solution. A responsible government would implement judicious austerity, firing the party hacks who were hired in the go-go years, cutting wages and pensions and restructuring itself to collect taxes and provide useful services, even while retaining transfers to the indigent and elderly. As public sector workers share the private sector’s pain, national solidarity could improve. Also, improved government efficiency and other structural reforms will make it easier for Europe to provide the financing that will prevent even more savage cuts to government functions. And it will make it easier to write down Greek debt further and attract private investment, giving people hope of growth.

Targeted government spending, or reduced austerity, along the lines suggested by sensible Keynesians, might be feasible in some countries and helpful in speeding recovery. But we should examine each policy based on a country’s circumstances. We should be particularly wary of populist Keynesians, who parrot “in the long run we are dead” to justify any short-sighted government action. They do the world a disservice by suggesting there are easy ways out. By misleading people and their leaders, they may well precipitate revolution rather than recovery.

Demanda agregada

Rodrigo Constantino*

“As estatísticas são como o biquíni: o que revelam é interessante, mas o que ocultam é essencial.” (Roberto Campos)

Não sei quanto ao leitor, mas eu demandaria um iate, um helicóptero e um jatinho se eu tivesse bilhões de dólares sobrando. Minha demanda tende ao infinito. Se não desfruto de tais bens materiais, isso se deve à falta de recursos, não de demanda. Esta conclusão pode parecer extremamente óbvia, e deveria. Infelizmente, a obviedade é algo em escassez quando se trata da economia keynesiana.
O foco obsessivo dos keynesianos em dados agregados acabou deturpando sua visão de mundo. Em vez de compreenderem que tais agregados servem, no máximo, como modelos simplificadores imperfeitos, esses economistas acabaram aceitando que a abstração era a realidade, gerando muita confusão teórica. O exemplo mais claro desta inversão é o tratamento dado ao PIB. A fórmula conhecida, Y = C + I + G + (X – M), produziu na cabeça dos mais desatentos uma crença absurda, qual seja, a de que o aumento dos gastos públicos é algo positivo para o crescimento econômico.
Como o governo não pode dar nada sem tirar do setor privado, pois suas fontes de recursos são os impostos, a inflação (que não passa de um imposto disfarçado) e o endividamento (que terá de ser pago eventualmente), claro que o aumento dos gastos públicos terá como contrapartida, inevitavelmente, a redução ou dos investimentos privados ou do consumo privado. Mas o foco demasiado no curto prazo, fruto de uma visão míope, faz com que os keynesianos negligenciem esses impactos negativos ao longo do tempo. Se o governo quer estimular o crescimento econômico e, portanto, a criação de empregos, basta ele expandir seus gastos.
Em Os pecados do capital, Robert Murphy dá um exemplo politicamente incorreto de falha no cálculo do PIB. Ele cita o caso de um homem que se casa com sua governanta, e explica: “Antes do casamento, os serviços dela (lavar, aspirar e cozinhar) eram comprados no mercado aberto e, portanto, contribuíam para o PIB oficial. Mas, depois do casamento, a nova dona-de-casa realiza essas mesmas tarefas ‘de graça’, fazendo o PIB oficial diminuir em função de seu salário anual anterior”. Da mesma forma, as operações no mercado negro, enormes em um país burocrático como o Brasil, não são computadas nos números oficiais do PIB. Ao excluir os gastos “intermediários” do cálculo, para evitar dupla contagem, o PIB “minimiza a importância dos capitalistas e exagera o papel dos consumidores finais e os gastos do governo”.
O economista Mark Skousen aponta outro exemplo dessas falhas:

Especialmente durante as festas natalinas, a mídia informa quase diariamente sobre as perspectivas das vendas a varejo, sugerindo que, se as vendas do Natal subirem, a economia está saudável e sólida. Por trás desses relatórios está a noção de que, se as festas natalinas durassem o ano inteiro, a economia poderia se expandir ainda mais

Entre vários problemas no cálculo do PIB, talvez o mais importante seja esse foco excessivo nos gastos, tanto dos consumidores como do governo. Isso passa a ideia de que são os gastos que geram a produção e, portanto, o crescimento econômico.
Keynes argumentava que, em períodos de insuficiente demanda agregada, caberia ao governo compensar esta queda com o aumento dos gastos. É a famosa política anticíclica. Foi a justificativa teórica perfeita para políticos ansiosos para torrar o dinheiro da “viúva” e conquistar votos pelas vias populistas. Claro que, na época da bonança e do forte crescimento econômico, o termo “anticíclico” era ignorado. A política acabava unidirecional, como se feita por economistas manetas. Mas o próprio conceito de demanda agregada insuficiente é falacioso. Parece que o rabo é que balança o cachorro, e não o contrário.
A lógica, de forma simplificada, funciona assim: a crise econômica ocorre como reação a uma queda da demanda agregada, sabe-se lá por qual motivo. Os empreendedores perderam seu “espírito animal” de repente. E cabe ao governo estimular a economia com aumento de gastos. Isso fará a demanda agregada subir, empregos serão criados e o consumo poderá retomar sua trajetória. Com mais consumo, as empresas produzem mais, empregando mais gente. Os salários podem aumentar, gerando um ciclo virtuoso. Parece tão simples que toda a miséria do mundo fica parecendo apenas resultado da falta de “vontade política”.
Claro que isso tudo não passa de uma grande falácia econômica. Os keynesianos trocam a ordem dos fatores, alterando o produto final. Basta pensar em Robinson Crusoé e Sexta-Feira em uma ilha. Seria absurdo supor que é a demanda de algum deles que produz o crescimento econômico. Robinson Crusoé pode demandar uma enorme casa, mas esta só será produzida se houver recursos disponíveis. E estes dependem da poupança e da produtividade. Logo, é a poupança efetiva que permite o investimento produtivo, que, por sua vez, possibilita mais consumo depois. É preciso fazer o bolo para depois comê-lo. Keynesianos pensam que podem ter e comer o bolo ao mesmo tempo.
Se alguém questiona quais fatores permitem o aumento da “renda nacional”, a resposta deverá ser: a melhoria dos equipamentos, das ferramentas e máquinas empregadas na produção, por um lado, e o avanço na utilização dos equipamentos disponíveis para a melhor satisfação possível das demandas individuais, por outro lado. O primeiro caso depende da poupança e da acumulação de capital; o segundo, das habilidades tecnológicas e das atividades empresariais. Se o aumento da renda nacional em termos reais é chamado de progresso, devemos aceitar que este é fruto das conquistas dos poupadores, investidores e empreendedores.
Os gastos do governo costumam desviar recursos destes fins mais produtivos. Keynes chegou no ponto absurdo de defender que seria justificável o governo, durante uma crise, contratar gente para cavar buracos e mais gente para tampá-los. Evidentemente que o fantástico desta proposta não passou despercebido na época. Questionado sobre o efeito de tais medidas no longo prazo, Keynes cunhou sua famosa frase: “No longo prazo estaremos todos mortos”. O longo prazo, porém, inexoravelmente chega, por razões cronológicas. Hoje, nada mais é que o longo prazo de algum tempo atrás. E, para aqueles vivos, o custo desta mentalidade keynesiana costuma ser bastante elevado.
Com esta ferramenta equivocada, os keynesianos conseguiram até mesmo creditar guerras pela recuperação econômica. Paul Krugman, laureado com o Prêmio Nobel de Economia e um dos maiores ícones do keynesianismo moderno, repete o tempo todo que foi a Segunda Guerra Mundial que salvou os Estados Unidos da Grande Depressão. Mais recentemente, ele chegou a defender que gastos públicos para criar um mecanismo de defesa contra a hipotética invasão alienígena seria uma medida sensata para conter a crise. Eis o grau de absurdo que chega à lógica keynesiana. Qualquer reflexão mais atenta mostraria que jamais pode ser favorável para a economia desviar recursos escassos para fins inúteis. Qual o ganho social em utilizar aço e trabalho escasso para produzir navios que serão afundados na guerra? Como dizia Mises, a prosperidade que a guerra traz para a economia é a mesma dos furacões e terremotos.
Na verdade, esta falácia é bem antiga, e já tinha sido refutada por Bastiat em seu exemplo da janela quebrada. Algum vândalo joga uma pedra que estilhaça a janela de uma loja. Em seguida, algumas pessoas tentam consolar o dono da loja alegando que, ao menos, ele estará gerando emprego ao consertar a janela. Afinal, se janelas nunca fossem quebradas, de que iriam viver os reparadores de janelas? Esta linha de raciocínio cai justamente na falácia anteriormente citada, pois ignora aquilo que não se vê de imediato. Sim, o conserto da janela iria propiciar um ganho para o vidraceiro. Mas o que seria feito desse dinheiro gasto caso a janela não tivesse sido quebrada? Eis a pergunta que nem todos fazem, porém crucial para o entendimento da economia.
Existem várias alternativas de uso que o dono da loja poderia dar ao dinheiro. Ele poderia investi-lo para aumentar a produção, poderia poupá-lo ou poderia gastar com qualquer outra coisa. Supondo que ele gastasse a mesma quantia na compra de um terno, o alfaiate teria sido beneficiado, mas agora que o dinheiro foi usado para consertar a janela, esse terno deixou de ser vendido. Isso é aquilo que não se vê, ao menos de imediato. O alfaiate do exemplo é ignorado, é o homem esquecido na análise superficial da coisa. Parece ridículo de tão óbvio este caso, mas o leitor mais leigo ficaria chocado com os demais casos, que são apenas variações dessa mesma falácia.
Como espero ter deixado claro, as recessões econômicas não são resultado de ausência de demanda agregada, pois esta nada mais é que o somatório da demanda de todos os agentes econômicos, que tende ao infinito. O buraco é bem mais embaixo. E quando o governo tenta estimular a economia gastando mais, endividando-se e contratando trabalhadores para tarefas improdutivas, isso apenas agrava o problema estrutural. Os consumidores e empresários sabem que terão de pagar a conta mais cedo ou mais tarde, e isso afeta suas decisões. Consumo estimulado artificialmente produz apenas inflação, se financiado pela emissão de moeda sem lastro. E o tiro keynesiano sai pela culatra, pois os investidores ficam receosos com o futuro aumento de impostos, necessário para honrar os gastos mais elevados do governo.
A hiperatividade do governo durante as crises costuma afetar negativamente a economia, ao contrário do que pensam os keynesianos. Manipular a “demanda agregada” jamais foi ou será uma política sensata de crescimento econômico sustentável. Os keynesianos são como alquimistas modernos, que acreditam poder transformar chumbo em ouro por meio da magia. Como os alquimistas antigos, estão fadados ao fracasso, sempre. Infelizmente, aprendemos com a história que poucos aprendem com a história.
A despeito dos inúmeros fracassos das políticas keynesianas no passado, eles sempre dão um jeito de ignorar as lições históricas e reinterpretar os fatos de forma a jogar a culpa dos erros em ombros alheios. O governo gastou trilhões em estímulos e, ainda assim, a economia ameaça nova recessão? Então, claro que o problema só pode ter sido falta de estímulo! Insanidade, já alertava Einstein, é fazer tudo igual novamente e esperar resultados diferentes. Os insanos estão no poder.

* Artigo inédito do livro "Liberal com orgulho" (Ed. Lacre, 2011)

A Nobel for Non-Keynesians

By DAVID R. HENDERSON, WSJ

On Monday the Nobel Committee announced the winners of the 2011 Nobel Prize in economics: Thomas J. Sargent of New York University and Stanford University's Hoover Institution, and Christopher A. Sims of Princeton University. The award was given for "their empirical research on cause and effect in the macroeconomy."

The Swedish economists announcing the award emphasized, correctly, the importance of Messrs. Sargent's and Sims's thinking about the role people's expectations play in economic decision making and the larger economy. But what they failed to mention is that their work has also offered empirical evidence that the school of thought known as Keynesian economics—which believes that government can turn a flagging economy around with the right combination of fiscal "stimulus" (generally government spending) and monetary policy—is fallible.

Mr. Sargent was an early and important contributor to the "rational expectations" revolution in macroeconomics, an area for which his sometime collaborator, Robert E. Lucas Jr., won the Nobel Prize in 1995. One of Mr. Sargent's key early contributions, along with University of Minnesota economist Neil Wallace, was the idea that people's expectations about government fiscal and monetary policy make it difficult for government officials to affect the economy in the ways they intend to.

If, for example, people get used to the Federal Reserve increasing the money supply when unemployment rises, they will expect higher inflation and will adjust their wage demands higher also. The result: The lower unemployment rate that the Fed was trying to achieve with looser monetary policy won't happen.

This conclusion was at odds with the Keynesian model, which dominated economic thinking from the late 1930s to the early 1970s. The Keynesian model posited a stable trade-off between inflation and unemployment. In 1970, major U.S. econometric models, built on Keynesian assumptions, predicted that the government could get the unemployment rate down to 4% if it accepted an increase in inflation to 4%. In a 1977 article titled "Is Keynesian Economics a Dead End?" Mr. Sargent wrote, "[I]nstead of 4-4, in the mid-1970s we got 9-9, a very improbable occurrence if econometric models of 1969 had been correct."

In his later work, Mr. Sargent explored expectations in other contexts. An important one is the issue of how a government can end high inflation. Mr. Sargent studied four countries that had hyperinflation in the early 1920s—Germany, Austria, Hungary and Poland. All used inflation to finance high government deficits. They all succeeded in eliminating hyperinflation, but to do so they had to be credible. Of course, they got rid of their old currencies and started new ones. But they also had to affect people's expectations by committing to substantially lower budget deficits. All four governments did.

Although the Nobel committee did not cite his work on unemployment insurance, Mr. Sargent, with Swedish economist Lars Ljungqvist, found that high, long-lasting unemployment benefits in Europe have caused many European workers who lose their jobs to stay unemployed for years and, thereby, erode their "human capital." This makes them less employable in the long run. The fact that the U.S. government has extended unemployment benefits in many U.S. states to 99 weeks, said Mr. Sargent in a 2010 interview with the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, "fills me with dread."

The work of Christopher Sims also undercut the large-scale Keynesian econometric models. His work is more technical than Mr. Sargent's but just as consequential. As the George Mason University economist Tyler Cowen wrote on his "Marginal Revolution" blog, "Think of Sims as an economist who found the traditional Keynesian methods 'just not good enough' and who worked hard to improve them. He brought a lot more rigor into empirical macro and he helped define a school of thought at the University of Minnesota. . . . I think of Sims's work as more defined by a method than by any set of conclusions."

Mr. Sims's big contribution was to use a statistical tool, the vector autoregression (VAR), to model the macroeconomy and make macro forecasts. Why did Mr. Sims choose that approach? Because, he wrote in a path-breaking 1980 article, the standard macroeconometric models rested on "incredible" assumptions. He could avoid stacking the deck by basing predictions of future variables on their own past values, on the past values of other variables, and on what economists call "exogenous shocks."

Mr. Sims does, of course, think beyond pure technique, and his research is always punctilious and often portentous. In 1999, for example, he suggested that the fiscal foundations of the European Union were "precarious" and that a fiscal crisis in one country "would likely breed contagion effects in other countries."

Both Messrs. Sargent and Sims are worthy Nobel recipients, for among other things putting a sizable chink in the Keynesians' armor.

Mr. Henderson, an economics professor at the Naval Postgraduate School and a research fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution, is editor of The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.

Why the Stimulus Failed

Editorial do WSJ

Even zero jobs growth in August doesn't seem to have disrupted President Obama's faith in the economic policies of his first three years, so one theme we'll be listening for in tonight's speech is how he explains the current moment. Why did his first jobs plan—the $825 billion stimulus—so quickly result in the need for another jobs plan?

For readers who want to know, an important account is offered in a pair of new Mercatus Center working papers by the George Mason economists Garett Jones and Daniel Rothschild, who did field research on what they call the supply side of the stimulus.

The Keynesian theory was that a burst of new government spending would take up some of the slack in aggregate consumer demand. This was justified in 2008, again in 2009, and is still defended now based not on real-world observation but on abstract macroeconomic models that depend on the assumptions of the authors. The Congressional Budget Office's quarterly studies—often cited to claim the stimulus created tens of thousands of new jobs—are based on such a model. By informative contrast, Messrs. Jones and Rothschild interviewed actual people who received stimulus dollars and asked how they spent the money.

In the first paper, the authors survey 85 different businesses, nonprofits and local governments across the country and conclude that "As is often the case when economic models are transferred from the blackboard to actual public policy, there was a gap between theory and practice."

One of the major patterns Messrs. Jones and Rothschild uncovered was that the top-down stimulus was poorly targeted. In one redolent example, a federal contractor said he was told to use smaller, nonstandard tiles that are harder and more expensive to install in order to increase the cost of the project. That way, the government could claim the money was moving out the door faster. The famous Milton Friedman line about government ordering people to dig with spoons to employ more people comes to mind.

In another case study, a budget shortfall forced a mid-size city to lay off 185 public workers—but the city received a $4 million stimulus grant to improve municipal energy efficiency. The manager of a construction company received funds for "the last thing on our list; and truthfully, the least useful thing." It happened to be a crane and a forklift.

The authors are careful to note that such anecdotes do not mean that all of the stimulus was a waste, and they did find some success stories. The problem is that all but the most reductionist Keynesians of the Paul Krugman school believe it matters what the government spends money on. A dollar that eventually will be taken out of the private economy through borrowing or higher taxes to fund pointlessly expensive projects—a la the tiny tiles—is not the way to nurture a recovery.

The second paper suggests that the stimulus did not "create or save" nearly as many jobs as the models indicate. On the basis of 1,300 interviews, Messrs. Jones and Rothschild estimate that merely 42.1% of the firms that received grants hired people who were unemployed. Instead, they poached workers from their competitors.

"This suggests just how hard it is for Keynesian job creation to work in a modern, expertise-based economy," they write. The stimulus "was implemented at a time when the Keynesian model had every chance of succeeding on its own terms. The high level of unemployment and the rapid deadline for spending created both the supply of workers and the demand for workers. If the job market results are so lackluster in this setting, economists should expect even weaker stimulative results during more modest recessions."

The lesson of such on-the-ground knowledge is that the stimulus was a lost opportunity. In practice it became a shotgun marriage between an economic theory justified by computer models and 40 years of liberal social priorities (clean energy, Medicaid expansions and the rest). This produced the 9.1% unemployment we now have.

The economy would have benefitted far more if the government had instead improved the incentives for people and businesses to invest, produce and grow. The President probably won't mention any of this, but it does explain why he has to give his latest speech.

Keynesianismo maneta

Rodrigo Constantino, para o Instituto Liberal

De forma bastante simplificada, o manual keynesiano manda o governo estimular a economia em épocas de recessão, e recolher os estímulos durante a bonança. Trata-se da conhecida política “anticíclica”. Não obstante as inúmeras críticas que esta política merece, por seu foco obsessivo em dados agregados e por ignorar o real funcionamento da microeconomia, a coisa fica muito pior quando um “pequeno detalhe” é costumeiramente esquecido pelas autoridades: a parte que fala em recolher os estímulos nos períodos de pujança.

Keynes acabou oferecendo, com embalagens teóricas, uma grande desculpa para a gastança desenfreada dos políticos irresponsáveis. Estes só se lembram das tais “medidas anticíclicas” quando o cenário se deteriora. Foi assim que a crise de 2008 ofereceu a justificativa perfeita para “sentar o pau na máquina” em 2009 e 2010 – “por acaso” um ano eleitoral. O governo Lula liberou geral a gastança com recursos alheios. Foi estímulo fiscal para todo lado, aumento acelerado de crédito público e redução da taxa de juros. A rodada de estímulos surtiu efeito momentâneo, e a economia brasileira cresceu mais de 7% no ano. Dilma foi eleita.

A fatura, entretanto, chegou. A inflação ultrapassou com folga a meta do Banco Central. O país entrou em “pleno emprego”. Sinais de superaquecimento surgiram em vários lugares. Era preciso entrar com urgência na fase de recolhimento dos estímulos. Mas o governo, naturalmente, detesta fazer isso. Cortar gastos vai contra a religião deles, ainda mais dos populistas. Foi assim que o BC de Tombini ficou “atrás da curva”, sem puxar como deveria a taxa de juros para conter a ameaça inflacionária, e o governo anunciou um “corte de gastos” que representa, na verdade, um aumento em relação a 2010.

Agora que as bolsas despencaram e alguns falam em nova recessão nos EUA, eis que “desenvolvimentistas” (leia-se, aqueles que adoram torrar o dinheiro dos outros) já começam a falar em nova rodada de medidas “anticíclicas”. Que raio de anticíclico é esse que só tem uma direção? Se a economia vai mal, então o governo gasta à vontade para estimulá-la; se a economia cresce, então o governo gasta mais porque pode. E assim caminha a insanidade, até o dia em que a farra fica insustentável, como ocorreu na Grécia. São os efeitos de um keynesianismo maneta.

The Global Rout

Editorial do WSJ

They say there's always a silver lining. Yesterday there wasn't. Markets around the globe sold off in a chaotic day. The Dow Jones Industrial Average's hair-raising ride ended the day down 512 points. The discernible theme among the wreckage was a generalized loss of confidence in the policy-making role of governments, here and in Europe.

If we had to single out one story in yesterday's events as suggestive of the depth of the desperation it was Bank of New York Mellon's announcement that it would start charging very large corporate and institutional depositors for the privilege of simply holding their cash. When even corporate treasurers are taking their money out of short-term securities and parking it in no-interest cash, you know the big boys are discovering the same anxieties Mom and Pop have known for a year as they ran out of safe havens for their assets.

Nominally, yesterday's rout began in Europe, as it became clear that the latest bailout of its debt-strapped nations isn't working and that the turmoil may spread to Spain and Italy. There is now fear that Europe will slide into recession, which would increase the odds of a United States double-dip.

As market participants sort through the charred tea leaves, they will note that oil prices fell below $89, three-month U.S. Treasury bills are yielding next to nothing, or that even the "safe haven" Swiss government felt obliged to drop interest rates near zero to protect its economy from an overvalued franc.

These volatile details matter, but the underlying problem remains unchanged: The economies of Europe and the United States have arrived at the moment when they no longer have any conceivable hope of being able to pay for the huge public commitments they've amassed the past 40 years. This year's "debt crisis" has been building for decades. European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet finished his public statement yesterday by calling on Europe, for the umpteenth time, to do "comprehensive structural reform."

Here in the U.S. we have just gone through three weeks of arduous negotiations between the President and Congressional leadership over spending, taxes and a U.S. debt ceiling above $14 trillion. The deal they struck hardly qualifies as comprehensive reform. President Obama's primary contribution, after he joined the talks, was to insist that the deal include tax increases, of all things, amid high unemployment and weak growth. A relatively more sensible deal with spending cuts alone was achieved only after House Speaker John Boehner announced he could no longer do business with the White House. Congressional Democrats and Republicans then cut a compromise.

In the wake of the debt deal, liberal economists are now complaining that the downward pressure on spending violates the Keynesian commandment to flood a faltering economy with government outlays.

We've done that. From the first months of the Obama Presidency, billions of stimulus have been injected into the economy, budgeted federal spending has grown toward 25% of GDP and the Federal Reserve has poured oceans of cash into the markets.

The Keynesians have fired all their ammo, and here we are, going south. Maybe now President Obama should consider everything he's done to revive the American economy—and do the opposite.